Colombia's Rain of Destruction, 11/20/00
by Sanho Tree, Institute for Policy Studies

http://www.ips-dc.org/projects/drugpolicy.htm

Next month, the United States will fund a massive escalation the aerial fumigation campaign in southern Colombia. Protected by US-supplied helicopters, Colombian government airplanes will dump record amounts of the broad-spectrum herbicide glyphosate onto one of the world's most biodiverse ecosystems in an effort to eradicate coca and poppy crops. In addition to the environmental ruin caused by fumigation, this rain of destruction also will devastate the lives and livelihoods of the indigenous peoples of the region. Aerial fumigation is not only ineffective at lowering drug use in the United States, it is also one of our most destructive policy options.

Our militarized counternarcotics strategy overwhelmingly emphasizes drug eradication, interdiction and law enforcement even though studies show that these are the least effective tools for reducing illicit drug use. A landmark study of cocaine markets by the conservative RAND Corporation found that, dollar for dollar, providing drug treatment to cocaine users in the US is 10 times more effective than drug interdiction schemes and 23 times more cost effective than trying to eradicate coca at its source. If decreasing drug use is our ultimate goal, why aren't we putting more resources into our woefully underfunded domestic drug treatment programs where each dollar spent is 23 times more effective?

After record amounts of US counternarcotics aid, Colombia actually surpassed Peru and Bolivia to become the world's largest coca producer. A recent GAO report found that, "Despite 2 years of extensive herbicide spraying, US estimates show there has not been any net reduction in [Colombian] coca cultivation - net coca cultivation actually increased 50 percent." Will a policy of doing more of the same produce a different result? Even if we are able to reduce coca cultivation in Colombia, the demand can be met by other regions in Latin America or even other parts of the world. 

Until we admit the drug economy is driven by three problems we refuse to seriously address (namely: poverty in drug producing countries, demand in rich countries, and the "value added" to these relatively worthless crops by our prohibition policies), we will never get a handle on this problem. As long as the US maintains its demand for cocaine, drug lords will find new ways to smuggle their product. And, as long as there is crushing poverty in Latin America, there will be a steady supply of poor peasants willing to grow the coca and poppy. Our policy of interdiction and eradication artificially escalates the value of these illicit crops and entices more impoverished campesinos into the drug economy. 

Colombia's conflict is driven by social, political, and economic forces. Guns, helicopters, and fumigation cannot solve the problems of hunger in Colombia or addiction in the US. The region is in desperate need of a mini-Marshall Plan, but our response has been to send them Desert Storm.

To make matters worse, policy makers cannot articulate a way by which we will extricate ourselves from this situation and the potential for a Vietnam-style quagmire in Colombia is alarming. Once again, there is no definition of "victory", no clear articulation of objectives, and no exit strategy. Will Congress settle for a 20%, 50% or 100% reduction in drug production? Or are we trying to push the guerillas south of the equator or are we trying to "degrade" their military capability a la Kosovo? Or will the war end when US drug use completely disappears? There is no capital city to occupy, no enemy flag to seize, and no geographical high ground to capture. How many Colombians are we prepared to sacrifice for such undefined objectives? Americans have a right to know what goals we must achieve before we can declare success and go home. This military assistance is the first in a series of blank checks in a war that has no endgame.

Do our elected representatives think it ethical for the US to escalate the vicious civil war in Colombia, risking the lives of peasants and indigenous people caught in the crossfire, to stop Americans from buying drugs? If so, they need a reality check. How can we eliminate drugs from the Andes when we can't even keep them out of our own prisons? It is simply wishful thinking and political scapegoating to think poor Andean countries can remedy the US demand for illicit drugs. Until we provide adequate resources for drug treatment, rehabilitation and prevention, the US will continue to consume billions of dollars worth of drugs and impoverished peasants will continue to grow them. 

If the drug war was evaluated like most other federal programs, we would have tried different strategies long ago. But our current policy seems to follow its own unique logic. A decline in drug use becomes evidence that we should invest more money and resources in the National Drug Control Strategy because it is working. A rise in drug use becomes proof that we are not doing enough to fight drugs, and must therefore redouble our efforts and funding. Under this unsustainable dynamic, funding and incarceration rates can only rachet upward. 

Our so-called War on Drugs has become an unending war against our own citizens and against our neighbors in this hemisphere. It is time to consider alternative policies that reduce the harm caused by drug abuse as well as reduce the harm caused by the drug war itself. When it comes to drug abuse and addiction, our problems and our solutions begin at home.